Liverpool felt utterly dominant in this game. They weren't perfect, and they did give up some chances and half chances on goal, but their tactics and overall play were another level above Newcastle.

In possession, Liverpool played what felt like a hybrid between a 4-back and a 3-back system. They did so by changing the positioning of the fullbacks. Trent stayed with Konate and Van Dijk in the back line most of the game. Tsimikas would start lower and then elevate up the pitch, and then the other three would slide to centralize. Liverpool started the game and, in my opinion, had the most success in the build-up when Gravenberch was the lone defensive midfielder. Macca and Szob (sorry, I can't be bothered to type their names out) played as attacking midfielders. Diaz drifted left with Tsimikas, while Jota and Salah went right. For the most part, they didn't play with a striker holding position down the middle.

There were some great offensive tactics I noticed from Liverpool, and I'm going to rattle them off here.

Throughout the game, they would purposely isolate Salah on the right side. This invited the fullback to step wide and high to cover him, as he didn't have anybody threatening the space behind him. The ball would get played to Salah, and if he didn't have a good chance to attack down the line he would play it back. This gave enough time for at least two other Liverpool players to make late runs in behind the Newcastle fullback who had just left their position to get on Salah's toes. It worked like a charm.

They wouldn't look to play the ball long as a first option, but they did threaten it constantly. Sometimes, they would send it. I would argue this was just to keep Newcastle on their toes.

On counter, Liverpool flood forward with options. Players would make runs without expecting the ball, which forced Newcastle to scramble a bit as they attempted to recover. This kind of movement opens up space, making the counter more dangerous on average.

Around the 14:45 mark, there was a brilliant example of tactical understanding from Macca. He could have turned, as there wasn't much pressure to his outside down the line. Instead, he didn't even look and played one touch back to Konate. This wasn't just lazy - not for the World Cup winning man. Macca knew there weren't numbers on the counter, so he slowed the game down to allow the people further up the pitch than him to get into position.

Whenever there's an apparent risk that the ball can be played long over the top, Szob and Diaz (and possibly others) make runs to draw people out of position, such as a dart through the middle. In addition, you'll often find one of the midfielders going very wide to play with the ball, which leaves gaps in the middle if the opponent doesn't purposely set up for a numbers advantage. Newcastle didn't, so this left space for Liverpool to move Newcastle's defense and play behind a line.

Grav took up the position of gliding in the middle amongst the Newcastle top 3. In this game, it wasn't a priority to move the ball through him. Instead, he exposed the gap between the top 3 and middle 3 by receiving balls that came to him from a higher position than his own.

Liverpool's collective understanding of each other's positioning is also so interesting to watch. It's at such a high level. They have the ability to play quickly in tight spaces and totally disrupt defensive pressure on a consistent basis.

Okay, that's all my thoughts specifically on Liverpool's offense.

Liverpool also had a fantastic defensive game. In transition moments, it's a swarm to the ball. The press relies on distance from the ball/player and "freedom" to run at it. If somebody is close to the ball without needing to mark somebody, they press right away to delay then to win. If the delay is successful, another person will press if THEY are close enough and not marking. If the opponent manages to establish possession, they drop into their defensive block and try to create small pockets of this press. It was very successful in this game.

The stats for this game read 61% possession for Liverpool. In my opinion, Newcastle were a bit restless on the ball. When you don't possess much, you don't create many chances. Therefore, it felt like they had a sense of urgency to go forward when they did have the ball. Sometimes, this led to a chance you would be willing to take, like a shot or a pass with dangerous potential. Regardless, they tended to lose the ball within a short period of time.

In addition, Liverpool's defensive structure seemed to be suffocating to the formation of Newcastle. When they got the ball going forward, they still had most of their numbers in the middle. This played into Liverpool's formation; Liverpool are okay with sacrificing space high and wide so that they are able to maintain their positioning in the middle and subsequently shift side-to-side to trap the opposing players.

Through 10 minutes, I found that Newcastle had almost no sustained possession. They tried to be tricky with repositioning as they built out. Livramento would shift into the middle and become another midfield pivot as Bruno G and Tonali would shift towards the ball. This worked on occasion, but it didn't lead to much in the end. It was immediately obvious that Schär and Burn were not comfortable playing with the ball. They didn't bring any patience to the build-up. I found that Newcastle's offense constantly felt isolated. They felt far too spread out on the wings and through the middle. On one occasion, I noticed that they countered off of a Liverpool pass, played the ball down the sideline and into the box, but then lost possession through the middle as the midfielders were so far back that Wilson and Willock had nowhere to go with it before Liverpool swarmed the area.

Newcastle did have moments where their press was effective. When I first noticed this, it coincided with Macca dropping in as a second pivot, which invited an extra Newcastle player forward. They took advantage. Overall, however, I found them largely ineffective.

Overall, Liverpool demonstrated a much higher understanding of their system. Newcastle played with little confidence, and this allowed Liverpool to impose their will on the game. In the end, they got it done.

Arsenal Offensive Shape: In offensive block, always have two options back-central. Wide fullbacks. One holding mid, the other central players (including the 9) stay a level higher. A key point here: if Brighton allows the ball to enter into the midfield 6 with space to turn, Arsenal can be very dangerous because they have a lot of number through the middle. As a result, Brighton allow space wide, which Arsenal play into.

When building up, they play with a back 4. As mentioned above, they have one CDM and the rest of the central players are 1-2 levels higher. Calafiori joins the midfield at times. This gives Arsenal an extra option in the midfield, which makes it almost unreasonable/impossible for Brighton to defend due to sheer numbers - if they send any more players into the middle, there's simply too much space for Arsenal to run into. That aside, Trossard has many yards to drop into to receive the ball as a consequence of Calafiori joining the midfield.

A note on Arsenal's play: they are willing to send the ball long if they're under pressure or feel the need to stretch Brighton.

Brighton Offensive Shape(s): Build up with back 4. Attacking mid is higher and sitting in space. They are inviting the Arsenal press and play extremely composed. They are very spread out. The 10 moves all over the place to try to find space (mentioned above).

In offensive block: 3 options back-central, wide fullbacks. They utilize runs forwards through the midfield + a check down from the striker to open up space. One midfielder sits as a connection in the middle.

In the second half, they changed their build-up play to use a 4-back system while maintaining width. On the left, I saw Estupiñan moving centrally so that Adingra could check down to the ball.

Arsenal Defensive Shape(s): Press the keeper with two people high and allow the ball wide. Keep many numbers in the middle. One midfielder holds. They try to prevent the ball from crossing the field.

In their own 1/3: they defend with a 4-back and wingers who drop into the back line to cover Brighton's (fullbacks?). The remaining players cover the midfield. They maintain a man-to-man number advantage so that they have the ability to press out of the midfield.

Brighton Defensive Shape(s): Defend with 5 and press aggressively in the wide areas at the level of their defensive line.

In Arsenal's 1/3, they press high with two. They cover the middle and try to force Arsenal to play. They try to send an extra number to the ball. They split the difference on players that are on the opposite side to the ball, and favor defending the midfielder when the ball switches.

Other notes follow:

Nwanieri scored the first goal but is losing his battle to Estupiñan most of the time.

Arsenal's first goal came from consistent movement into space. They naturally drifted into open areas as the play demanded and, with good control of the ball, found space behind Brighton. Brighton lost their positional awareness in the process and allowed Nwanieri a lot of space behind.

First half review? If Brighton don't fall asleep defensively, I think they're happy with how this first half goes. It's been very competitive. Neither side have created any great chances. Offensively, Brighton have many players behind the ball and find it hard to disrupt Arsenal's defensive shape. Naturally, they need to find more passes that break lines vertically. For Arsenal, I would say that they need to maintain the ball more effectively during their transition up the field so that they can establish their offensive block.

Martinelli on for Nwanieri at halftime is a switch intended to add more possession to Arsenal's play; Martinelli is very good with the ball at his feet.

When an undefeated team through league, cup, and continental play loses the Europa League final, there's bound to be some interesting features to the game. Given the significance of this season for Leverkusen, I'm focusing mostly on their performance and how Atalanta stifled their style.

The first thing I want to point out is Atalanta's first two goals. Both came from "sleepy-at-best" defending from Leverkusen. The second goal (and eventual third) were fantastic finishes from Lookman. However, each of these goals could've been prevented.

The first goal was a lack of concentration from Palacios. He was caught ball-watching and gave Lookman the time to get to the ball. The second goal was a turnover that ended up in Lookman's possession, and a lack of coverage from Tapsoba forced Xhaka to chase on the recovery. Lookman exposed Xhaka, who should have forced Lookman to his weaker left foot, and rifled the ball into the bottom right corner.

The third goal was a result of Leverkusen overextending to try and get back into the game, as well as Lookman's individual brilliance.

Besides the moments immediately surrounding those three goals, I would have said Leverkusen looked in control. They had more of the ball, though they were never able to create chances.

Both teams set up in a 3-4-2-1. Leverkusen's buildup had three centre-backs, two defensive-midfielders, and two wing-backs. Wirtz played as an attacking-midfielder. Adli lined up as a lone striker. Frimpong played mostly as a right-winger. On the other hand, Atalanta's 5-back was intended more for defensive purposes. In their build-up, they ran a 4-back system with at least one defensive-midfielder. For the most part, they didn't want to possess in their defensive third. Instead, they looked to play long balls for forwards to control and bring others into play.

Leverkusen's ineffective build-up and Atalanta's defense are the star of this show. Atalanta's press started with 3 men matching up against the 3 Leverkusen centre-backs. The Atalanta wing-backs stayed relatively central until their opposing wing-back was able to receive the ball, and it was at this moment that they triggered their press. Leverkusen's style is known to depend on the play of their two defensive-midfielders. Atalanta placed a man on each of these two players, and their goal was to keep these players facing their own goal. With a 5-back system, Atalanta was able to man-mark Wirtz by allowing one of the 3 centre-backs to follow him (within reason). Atalanta focused on shielding the middle of the field and keeping Leverkusen moving in one direction. Leverkusen's moments of success came when they were able to get several players behind the 3 men at the front of Atalanta's press.

The first thing I don't understand about Leverkusen's shape was why Frimpong was occupying the wide areas when Stanisic was also on the same side. In the first half, Stanisic played as the right wing-back in Leverkusen's buildup. I believe the intention is to have him high and wide, which stretches Atalanta and makes it harder for them to cover the midfield areas. However, he was often much deeper than he should've been because Frimpong was occupying that space. At the same time, this gave Leverkusen very little presence in the middle of the field past their defensive midfielders. An interesting consequence of this shape is that Atalanta didn't have to defend the areas which would typically be occupied by their defensive midfielders. So... they didn't. At times, they sent their midfielders high to press, leaving Leverkusen with very little room to breathe in front of their own goal.

On top of that, their lone striker was Adli, who doesn't really fit the role of a target 9. Leverkusen often tried to find him with long balls over the top, or to his feet with hold up play. This was difficult because he was outsized by all of the Atalanta centre-backs, as well as outnumbered due to the extra centre-back in the 5-back system. Additionally, even if he did get the ball there was nowhere to go with it because 7 of Leverkusen's 10 players were nearly 30 yards behind the ball.

In the end, Leverkusen had moments of success with possession, but they were never able to create chances. Atalanta's defense prevented Leverkusen from developing any rhythm, but - of course - made its own mistakes over time. However, in their defensive third, Atalanta always tried to place at least 7 players behind the ball. As a result, the few chances Leverkusen did have in Atalanta's half came highly contested, and they were unable to capitalize.

I want to focus a little more on the tactics of this game and less on commentating how the game unfolded by scoreline and major events.

First of all, some basics: I found that Leverkusen defended in a 5-3-2. This quickly turns into a 5-2-3 when they trigger a press. There are no positions defined per player; instead, there just needs to be a player in every role. The two high-point players begin by covering the middle and letting the opponent choose a side. Then, the far-side high-point comes more central to cover balls coming through the vertical center of the field. The near-side high point player presses the ball, often attempting to cut off a return pass. The formation turns into a 5-2-3 when the highest midfielder runs forward to cover the closest opposing midfielder from receiving the ball centrally. The other two midfielders push up to cover long balls into central areas, while the wingbacks cover the wide opposition players. One of the big points of emphasis for this defense is to restrict any central possession and defend patiently while waiting to trigger the press.

Roma dominated on the ball early. I found that they attacked in a 4-2-4. The two CBs act as primary ball handlers, moving play from side to side. In this particular game, Angeliño was the only true fullback. As a result, one of the three central midfielders drops into the back line on the right side. Both Angeliño and the midfielder take positions in the wide spaces. The two remaining midfielders played flat to each other and explored spaces between the lines. The two wingers played high and wide. The two forwards primarily began in high positions, and one of them would often drop into space to receive the ball if a run was needed.

Leverkusen's starting positions in the attack looked like a 3-2-5. They played with three central defenders to anchor the attack. These three shift from side to side and maintain their positioning. Xhaka and Palacios are connected at all times, playing either in a flat line or a vertical line. They have clear instructions to always be options for each other. Hofmann drifts into spaces around the pitch, generally taking a higher position than either of the other two midfielders. Grimaldo and Frimpong occupy the wide areas, while Adli and Hlozek start centrally. There was always one forward pinning the back line, and it was generally Hlozek. This is where the positional play stops. The players are given freedom to play in a so-called 'relational' style, which means that they often come in close quarters to each other to create numerical advantages and make quick combinations. Runs constantly test empty space, especially in behind the back line. Leverkusen, altogether, are extremely patient on the ball, but not slow. They are constantly searching and changing the angle of attack.

Roma defended in a 5-2-3. They often let Leverkusen possess the ball with numerical advantages in the wide areas while trying to restrict the center. To be honest, I'm not impressed at all with their defensive gameplan. I'm struggling to see how they limited Leverkusen's time on the ball. They didn't concede many clear-cut chances during the first hour - and there is something to be said about this. But it constantly felt like Leverkusen's patience allowed them to have their way with Roma's defense.

Now I'd like to point out some of the things I took away from the first hour of this game. Defensively, Leverkusen want to constrict their opponent's space and give them little time on the ball. This is the kind of press that makes an opponent constantly work for their possession, and it works particularly well on opponents who are not skilled in high-intensity possession.

Roma know Leverkusen are well organized, so they keep a handful of players high and try to break lines very quickly. Allowing Leverkusen time to establish their press is obviously a bad thing.

I think Roma are mistaken for allowing Leverkusen too much time on the ball. When Leverkusen does have the ball, it feels like there's a lack of intensity from Roma to close them down. Leverkusen's use of “relational” soccer is questioning Roma because players don't know when to follow runs. An interesting dynamic between the teams is that if Roma were to bring players closer to one another and try to set up the relational play that Leverkusen does, I feel like Leverkusen would simply press them. They would accept that Roma are in tight spaces and force them to make mistakes. However, Roma do not seem to want to do the same defensively. They allow Leverkusen numerical advantages in small areas and maintain their positions.

Throughout the first half, Madrid largely dominated the game with their unique style and great number of skilled players. Alavés did a good job of compressing the space directly in front of their own box, limiting the chances that Madrid had on goal. Madrid ran into problems when Nacho committed his red card offense, but eventually scraped out a victory.

Madrid's offensive shape looked like a 4-2-2-2. Throughout their buildup play, at least one of the four midfielders would drop into the back line. They split the CB and fullback to receive the ball, opening passing lanes through the midfield and allowing the fullback to advance. The other of the two pivots typically looked to occupy open areas in the middle or opposite side of the field. The two attacking midfielders remained advanced on either side, along with one of Rodrygo or Díaz, effectively leaving the middle of the field open.

Madrid play with an incredibly fluid positions. The shape remains largely the same (although positioning depends slightly on players' natural movements), but every player played nearly every position. Not many teams can do this, but across the board Madrid possess an extremely high level of skill and a great understanding of the tactical system.

I really enjoyed watching them play with the ball. They took care of the ball, displaying an extraordinary 91.9% accuracy with their passes. They would look to advance the ball on the sides, bringing numbers with the ball and overloading one side. If they needed to switch, they would swing across the back line. This style quite often left the middle of the field absent of a midfielder or forward, but they still used this space: while moving the ball on one side, one of the far-side midfielders or forwards would look to make a run into this space either to receive or to force the Alavés defense to respond.

Defensively, Alavés played in a 4-4-2. They engaged with Madrid near midfield. Their attacking midfielder joined the striker to press the ball. The fullbacks and would mark the highest, widest player. The near-side winger would mark the fullback, while the far-side winger would slide into the weak side of the midfield. In their defensive third, they compressed the space in front of their goal and allowed Madrid to have their possession in the flanks. They did an honestly good job at minimizing the effectiveness of Madrid's movements through the center.

Offensively, Alavés mostly struggled to possess until Nacho received a red card. They built with a 4-2-1-3. They had two pivots in the midfield with their wingers high and wide. I noticed that in moments of possession in their attacking half, they would start to look like a 2-4-4 with very advanced positions.

This was a largely tactical battle thanks to some touch defending on either side of the ball. This was accentuated by Nacho's red card, as Madrid were forced to play a little more defense. In the end, Madrid's quality shined through and they escaped with a win.

Barcelona dominated the first half, but they did so without much success in front of goal. They played with their signature slow-tempo possessive style, but struggled to connect in the final third. For the most part, Almería were able to minimize Barça's possession in front of the box. Almería didn't play with enough bravery to break down Barça's press on most occasions. In that sense, Almería found most of their success when Barcelona turned over the ball or got impatient in their buildup.

Offensively, Barça played in a 3-2-2-3 while building up through midfield. Once they established themselves in the opponent's half, Cancelo would move forward to become a midfielder or winger, leaving Christensen and Araujo as pivots in the back. This shape looked more like a 2-4-4. Barça absolutely possessed the skill to break down Almería's initial press, but it looked like they were struggling in the final third. Their movements were not fluid, and many players would receive the ball and take several touches before releasing it. Their pace was slow, and Almería were able to stay compact in the middle.

Almería's offensive shape looked like a 4-2-3-1. They had moments, but for the most part they struggled under the pressure from Barça's press. Barça often set up in a 4-2-3-1 defensively, with Lewandowski at the 9. Gündoğan would leave the midfield to join Lewandowski up front, allowing Barça to have constant pressure on the ball. Then, depending on where the ball was moving, all players in coverage would look to find the next options and squeeze all space from them. At one point, Almería played quick enough to break down the press and find space in Barcelona's half. They also struggled to create chances, as Barcelona's defense was able to contain the attacks.

The big takeaways from the first half were the mistakes that Barça made. Sergi Roberto had a free header early, and he probably should have scored. Barça were clearly the better team, but their play felt slow. If Almería were braver on the ball, I think they could have found success as Barça's defensive effort wasn't high enough. Barça's movement in the final third felt like it was compressing the space rather than opening space. There were very limited options, and maybe this is something to credit Almería for. However, I think Barça should have been able to find more space in between the lines. Barça's first goal came from a good win off of a corner kick. Almería's first goal came from a complete lapse of concentration from Araujo.

Overall, Barça showed signs of weakness and Almería didn't capitalize on them. While Barça were clearly the better team, they played without cohesion and, seemingly, a slight lack of focus.

This game was a tale of two halves. City dominated most of the first half, scoring once early and continuing to push for a second. Shortly into the second half, City were able to find their second. However, they began to play with more freedom, making more mistakes and taking less care of the ball. Palace capitalized on one of these mistakes to score their first, and pure effort in the dying moments of the game gave them the opportunity to equalize.

City play with a largely fluid offensive system. Their centerbacks possess the ball, unafraid to hold it and look in the middle for options. Rodri played as the lone 6 for most of the game. On the left side, Grealish and Gvardiol would switch freely. On the right, City isolated Bernardo one-on-one with the fullback. Foden and Lewis would join Álvarez on the front line, often looking to find space in between the lines. With the high level of skill that they possess, it was normal to see one of the advanced players drop to receive the ball, then try to quickly combine in the space that opened up.

Palace's defense in the first half was bad. They only conceded once, but they didn't do much to stop City's offensive possession. Their press was largely ineffective, so they would end up in a defensive block. To be fair, they did a good job of putting numbers in front of their own box (sometimes up to 6 players in the back line) to prevent City from becoming dangerous. They did not do a good job of winning the ball in dangerous areas, so they were forced to defend and turned the ball over quickly.

Going into the later stages of the second half, City started to become a little more careless with the ball. They had a 2-0 lead at home after the 70th minute, and they started to give more opportunities to Palace. Even with these opportunities, Palace didn't possess well. Their offense - throughout most of the game - was entirely based on individual effort from balls played long and into space. A great piece of work from Mateta brought Palace within one goal, so they began extending themselves and pressing with more intensity in hopes of securing a point.

In the end, I would place this result on mental focus. Even with a defensive game plan clearly set out, Palace were not very effective in their execution. City could have run away with this game. However, their lack of focus came back to haunt them, and it turned into a mental battle that Palace will feel like they won.